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Theme1: The General Affairs Council (GAC) has so far not lived up to the expectations 
created by the Treaty of Lisbon, which in principle assigned it an important position within 
the EU system. 
 
 
Summary: The EU’s new General Affairs Council (GAC) –chaired by the Trio 
Presidency– was designed to fulfil the role of strategic coordinator of policy-making in the 
Union. Nearly a year-and-a-half since its creation, this aim is even more pertinent than 
ever, since the need to develop that function has become more acute. The GAC has not 
asserted itself politically and other possible coordinators that are well established and 
permanently based in Brussels –such as the President of the European Council, the 
COREPER, and even the Secretariat General of the Council– are not the ideal actors to 
carry out the coordinating function, which needs a strong political involvement of the 
member states at the ministerial level. The GAC has probably achieved the basic goal of 
guaranteeing a minimum of consistency in the work of the nine other Council 
configurations and it has formally prepared and followed up on the meetings of the 
European Council. However, it has failed to become a powerful and distinctive actor with 




Analysis: The first 18 months of the Lisbon Treaty –those corresponding to the Spanish, 
Belgian and Hungarian Trio Presidency of the EU– have left a rather bittersweet aftertaste 
over what were supposed to have been the positive effects of the new decision-making 
framework that proved so hard to agree on and then ratify. It is clear that the treaty in and 
of itself would not make Europe resolve the large-scale challenges that the integration 
process has been facing over the past few years: the financial turbulence and recession in 
2008-09, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis and, more generally, the changes in global 
economic competitiveness and Europe’s declining international position in a context of 
major geopolitical shifts. Nevertheless, the new mechanisms of the Lisbon Treaty have 
helped the EU to better address the issues in which there was at least a minimum of 
political will. To give two examples: (1) the institutionalisation of the European Council 
was an advantage, rather than an added difficulty, in moving towards the reinforced 
economic governance or the so-called‘Pact for the Euro’; and (2) the strengthening of the 
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European Parliament has been more a source of support than a hindrance in designing 
and launching the External Action Service. 
 
Although it is still early to assess the changes in the institutional balance of the system as 
a whole, in general the new tools have improved the EU's political performance with 
regard to a greater continuity in policy-making, the visibility of decisions and 
accountability. That said, it is also true that the treaty makes for a greater complexity in 
decision-making and this requires more political coordination between the institutions 
involved. The first four of the final recommendations in the previous edition of the Think 
Global, Act European project had to do precisely with the need to coordinate better. In 
particular, the first of them made an appeal to ‘ensure that the new General Affairs 
Council –chaired by the Trio Presidency– fulfilled the role of a strategic coordinator of 
policy-making in the EU’. Nearly a year-and-a-half later, the recommendation is even 
more pertinent than it was then, since the need to develop that function has become more 
acute. The General Affairs Council (GAC) has not asserted itself politically and other 
possible coordinators that are well established and permanently based in Brussels –such 
as the President of the European Council, the COREPER, and even the Secretariat 
General of the Council– are not the ideal actors to carry out that function, which needs a 
strong political involvement of the member states at the ministerial level. 
 
The GAC was created in late 2009 as a new configuration of the Council, by splitting it 
from the former General Affairs and External Relations Council, with the other part 
becoming the new Foreign Affairs Council. The idea was to distinguish clearly between 
the definition of the EU's international action, on the one hand, and the transversal 
coordination of all issues that the Council dealt with, on the other. Thus, in the first case, 
the Foreign Ministers –and, sometimes, those responsible for Defence, Development or 
Trade– acted as representatives of the member states on foreign and security matters 
under the stable Presidency of the High Representative. And in the latter, the Ministers of 
Foreign or European affairs –under the six-month rotating Presidency– would have to 
carry out three functions. The first of these, considering the fact that the Council still has 
nine vertical configurations, involves the need to give consistency to sectoral work. 
Secondly, to the extent that there are transversal issues that are difficult to assign to the 
vertical councils– such as enlargement, for instance–, it makes sense for there to be a 
horizontal body in charge of these issues. And the third of these functions, in light of the 
separation between the European Council and the Council as different institutions, stems 
from the need to connect the former’s role as provider of political drive to the latter’s role, 
which is fundamentally legislative. 
 
None of this was achieved in the first three Presidencies under the Lisbon rules. The GAC 
has probably achieved the basic goal of guaranteeing a minimum of consistency in the 
work of the nine other Council configurations and it has formally prepared and followed up 
on the meetings of the European Council. However, it has failed to become a powerful 
and distinctive actor with a strategic approach. In reality, given the clear loss of functions 
and visibility of the six-month Presidencies after the treaty came into force, it is odd that 
neither Spain nor Belgium or Hungary have harnessed and strengthened this new body, 
which, under the Lisbon Treaty, is the remaining privileged instrument of the rotating 
Presidency to maintain its influence on EU policy-making. Certain factors inherent in the 
Presidencies help explain this weakness: Spain’s relative state of confusion over the new 
treaty in force during a semester that was considered transitional, the fact that Belgium 
had an interim government and the novelty in Hungary of holding the EU Presidency for 
the first time. Besides this, the very difficult economic situation meant that most politicised 
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inter-governmental decisions were assigned to the heads of government at the European 
Council. In any case, it is not at all certain that during the next Trio of Presidencies –to be 
held by Poland, Denmark and Cyprus– there will be a political strengthening of the GAC 
and a clarification of its functions. 
 
There are other, more structural factors which explain why so far the GAC is not living up 
to the expectations created by the Treaty of Lisbon, which in principle assigned it an 
important position within the EU system. These factors include departmentalisation, which 
is intrinsic to the Council’s functioning as an institution, the discontinuity inherent to the 
system of rotating six-month Presidencies and the relative lack of interest shown by 
Foreign Ministers –who for the most part make up the GAC– in most of the issues that are 
on this Council’s agenda. 
 
Why is it important to strengthen the GAC council and how can progress towards that goal 
be made over the next 18 months? Boosting this body is a good idea both in terms of 
institutional efficiency and democratic legitimacy. The GAC is potentially well placed to 
help provide the European policy-making process with more coordination (efficiency) and 
more visibility (legitimacy). The idea would be to offset the myriad fragmented sources of 
power that now characterise the Council itself –the Trio of Presidencies, the High 
Representative, the Eurogroup and other specialised configurations under the rotating 
Presidency– and the EU as a whole –the European Council, the European Commission, 
the European Parliament and national parliaments–. The work of effective coordination 
and democratic transparency in the decision-making process must be accepted by 
member states as well as by EU institutions. And it would seem that the GAC –inasmuch 
as it is a European institution that at the same time has an intrinsically inter-governmental 
nature– could be the ideal body for that purpose. The COREPER and the General 
Secretariat of the Council can certainly help the decision-making process to be more 
consistent. But their technical nature prevents them from doing it with a strategic vision, 
and in any case they are actors that operate in an opaque fashion without any orientation 
towards public discourse or accountability. For its part, the European Council can, of 
course, help achieve major political consensuses on integration. However, it is unable to 
get involved directly in the drafting or implementation of legislation and therefore its 
relations with the European Parliament and Commission are very limited. 
 
Recommendations: How Can the General Affairs Council be Strengthened? 
The GAC has room for political strengthening in each of the three major functions 
assigned to it by the Treaty and by Council’s Rules of Procedure: 
 
(a) Regarding the coordination of all the Council’s configurations. 
(b) Regarding transversal issues. 
(c) Regarding the preparation for and the follow-up to the European Council. 
 
(a) Regarding the Coordination of All the Council’s Configurations 
At the Constitutional Convention of 2002-03 it was proposed that the new GAC should 
concentrate all the Council’s legislative activity on the basis of the prior deliberations 
carried out by its various specialised configurations. This proposal, intended to guarantee 
coherence, was rejected at the intergovernmental conference of 2004 because of the 
profound implications it would have for how the institution worked: since the outset of the 
integration process, it has been understood that the Council has been formally convened 
and enjoys all of its attributions and prerogatives, regardless of whether it is made up of 
Ministers of specific sectors or of Foreign Affairs. However, adopting a rather more 
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political than legal approach with regard to the goal of coherence, the GAC should 
nevertheless have efficient mechanisms for undertaking one of its main missions: 
guaranteeing consistency in the Council’s work. The success of its ties with the European 
Council also depends on this. 
 
To this end, and in strict application of the principle of primus inter pares (‘first among 
equals’), the GAC could carry out a thorough examination of the activity of the nine other 
councils and be able to express observations, suggestions or even –although obviously 
with caution– warnings based on the programme and priorities of the semester and/or the 
Trio. By the same token, in cases of doubt, the specialised configurations of the Council 
could encourage a political ‘appeal’ to the GAC for it to set the position of the institution. It 
is not so much an issue of changing the rules governing the Council as having the 
members of the GAC embrace a certain degree of political authority over the rest of the 
other configurations, which, in any case, would continue to be technically equals. 
Otherwise, if the work of the GAC is limited to a routine review of what has been done by 
the other configurations, it will not be contributing any added value to the goal of 
consistency; in any case, it would be contributing much less than what is contributed by 
the ambassadors of the COREPER, which would not seem very reasonable. What is 
more, looking at the specific exercise of the rotating Presidencies and considering that in 
some member states governments do not have good domestic coordination mechanisms, 
this role of the GAC would be most welcome. Finally, the role could become essential if 
the Presidencies of the Trio decided to divvy up by sector the work of the different Council 
formations during the 18-month period. 
 
That said, it is no secret that this function would have a particularly delicate dimension in 
terms of the Foreign Affairs Council, assuming that in that case the High Representative 
assumes the permanent Presidency. However, and precisely because the rotating 
Presidency does not in this case act as leader of the meetings, the task of providing 
consistency to the work of the Council is even more necessary. Of course, the GAC would 
have to act with special care to avoid any temptation to re-appropriate the CFSP dossiers. 
But it is also true that almost all the specialised councils have an external dimension; for 
instance, Justice and Home Affairs in issues of international terrorism, ECOFIN in matters 
of global economic governance, the Environment in issues of climate change and the 
GAC itself, which is in charge of enlargement policy. This can trigger occasional 
inconsistencies or even conflicts which only the GAC –with the rotating Presidency acting 
more than ever as an honest broker– can resolve. 
 
(b) Regarding Transversal Issues 
The second line of strengthening is very closely linked to the goal of achieving 
consistency in the Council’s work. Along with the need to coordinate sectoral issues, there 
is the need to take the lead in issues that are transversal by definition and affect several 
Council formations without clearly being the responsibility of any specific one of them. 
These are the dossiers which intrinsically involve the politics of European integration in 
itself, such as reform of the Treaties, enlargement policy, negotiation of financial 
perspectives and the agenda of structural reforms, now known as the Europe 2020 
Strategy. All of these issues affect the rest of the formations, depending on the cases, 
especially the ECOFIN, the Competitiveness Council and the Foreign Affairs Council. 
However, due to its horizontal nature only the GAC can manage consistently and with 
strategic vision the agenda-setting process and the final decision-making. Otherwise, 
many dimensions of these transversal dossiers –obviously basic for European 
integration– could slip into a limbo. In all of these cases, however, the final word rests with 
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the European Council. Thus, from a functional standpoint it is necessary to channel in an 
orderly fashion the upward conduit –in other words, the decision-making process– or the 
descending one –in the application of whatever has been decided by the heads of 
government, which go from one institution to another–. 
 
For this same reason, the Council’s institutional relationship with the Commission, the 
European Parliament, the Court of Justice and national legislatures should be channelled 
through the GAC. The rest of the Council’s formations would of course continue to deal 
with the Commission or the European Parliament in legislative work or in specialised 
political control. But the actual management of the policy of inter-institutional balance, of 
political dialogue and the job of acting as spokesman of the Council –except in foreign 
affairs– must correspond to the GAC. Furthermore, this will give the institution projection 
in the news media and thus among Europe’s citizenry. It is not a matter of adding more 
complications to the image of the EU as a whole, which in principle should be 
concentrated in the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission 
and the High Representative. Rather, the idea is to add consistency and visibility to the 
Council’s now-fragmented voice. This translates clearly into presenting before the 
European Parliament the priorities and conclusions of the semester or in other 
circumstances which require the Council as such to speak out. This relative 
personification of the Council can also be useful from a domestic point of view for 
whatever country holds the six-month Presidency. 
 
(c) Regarding the Preparation for and the Follow-up to the European Council 
The Council’s ties to the European Council –now that the Treaty of Lisbon has separated 
the two institutions– are maintained at the administrative level by the General Secretariat 
which is common to both, and at the political level by the GAC, at least in theory. In actual 
practice, and bearing in mind what has been said so far, this function has only been 
carried out formally during the first months after the Treaty came into force. For this 
reason, if one were to manage to improve the GAC’s ability to coordinate vertical issues 
and lead the horizontal ones, along the way one could achieve that third element of 
political strengthening of the Council. In other words, to the extent that the GAC assumes 
the task of establishing a strategic position for the Council and lending more consistency 
to its legislative work, it will be much easier to go about the true political preparation of the 
meetings of the European Council, substantially fuel its conclusions and ensure an 
effective continuity in the legislative implementation of the politically-driven decisions 
made by the heads of government. 
 
Besides all that has been discussed so far, in order to achieve this result it would be 
necessary to boost the GAC’s ties with the European Council through two channels: on 
the one hand, with the permanent President and, on the other, with the heads of State or 
Government. In the former, the idea is to strengthen inter-relations and to do so both for 
the formal meetings of the European Council and for the increasingly frequent informal 
meetings. So far President Van Rompuy has acted in a loyal way and organised efficient 
contacts and prior meetings –usually, in the format of dinners– but perhaps it would be a 
good idea to go a step further. For example, now that it seems clear that the Prime 
Ministers of the countries holding the rotating Presidency have ruled out the possibility of 
chairing GAC meetings, it might be interesting to invite to the European Council, along 
with the Prime Minister whose turn it is to speak first to his/her colleagues, the member of 
the national government who has effectively presided over the GAC. 
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As for boosting the ties between the GAC and the heads of government of member 
states, the way to go is not within European institutions but rather through national 
capitals. For this reason, achieving this goal depends on progress that can only be 
completed through an indirect and probably slow process of changing the current GAC. It 
is a matter of hooking up the members of the GAC in a more or less formal way with 
Prime Ministers’ or Governments’ Offices of the member states. And in an implicit way, 
that connection should mean that the makeup of the GAC would no longer be Foreign 
Ministers, who should concentrate on the Foreign Affairs Council, and shift to Ministers for 
European Affairs. This does not necessarily mean that European policy would no longer 
be linked to the Foreign Ministries of the 27 member states. But it would in fact mean that 
the European Minister –even in cases in which he or she is a junior figure– would also 
have domestic authority that only comes if they, apart from still being connected to the 
Foreign Ministries, are very close to the Prime Minister. 
 
It is unclear if this network of ‘top national officials’ tasked exclusively with European 
affairs will be created. Nevertheless, the post-Lisbon EU seems to require that key 
political representatives of the member states, who are domestically close to the 27 heads 
of government, can lead the ever more complex national formation of European policy 
and, therefore, can monopolise their countries’ participation in the GAC. This is already 
the case in some member states, such as Sweden and Slovenia, but it remains to be 
seen whether or not a true European network of politicians is gradually consolidated 
whose strategic role –coordinating and serving as a liaison between the EU and the 
member states– can be a key factor for the future of European integration. The next Trio 
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